ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE REVISITED:
THE IMPENDING NECESSITY OF
JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
IN THE REALM OF VOTER REGISTRATION
MARK THOMAS QuINLIVANt

No right is more precious in a free country than that of
having a voice in the election of those who make the laws
under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights,
even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is
undermined.
-

Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964)

As long as ours is a representativeform of government, and
our legislatures are those instruments of government elected
directly by and directly representative of the people, the
right to elect legislatorsin a free and unimpairedfashion is
a bedrock of our political system.
-

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964)

Twenty-five years ago, the United States Supreme Court intervened in the electoral realm and mandated the rule of "one person, one
vote" in congressional1 and state legislative2 districting.3 After having
found the redistricting question to be justiciable in Baker v. Carr4 and
faced with gross malapportionment and legislative resistance to reform,5
t B.S.F.S. 1987, Georgetown University; J.D. Candidate 1990, University of
Pennsylvania.
See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964).
2 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
Technically, the terms "apportionment" and "reapportionment" describe the
process of allocating representatives among pre-established districts. The terms "districting" and "redistricting" refer to the process of formulating the boundaries of these
districts. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 161 n.1 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring
and dissenting). State legislators redistrict (rather than reapportion) state and federal
legislative districts. See Dixon, The Warren Court Crusadefor the Holy Grail of "One
Man-One Vote," 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 219, 219 n.4, cited in Comment, Politics and
Purpose:Hide and Seek in the GerrymanderingThicket After Davis v. Bandemer, 136
U. PA. L. REV. 183, 183 n.1 (1987). Despite these differences, Wesberry and Reynolds
are often referred to as reapportionment cases, rather than redistricting cases.
4 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
' The extent of malapportionment existent in the United States in the early 1960s
is described infra notes 140-48 and accompanying text. Legislative resistance to reform
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the Court declared that "the fundamental principle of representative
government in this country is one of equal representation for equal
numbers of people, without regard to race, sex, economic status, or
place of residence within a State."' The Court also found the right to
vote to be "a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society" as a
"preservative of other basic civil and political rights,"' further ensuring
that all qualified persons would be able to exercise the franchise
equally in a "free and unimpaired manner."' The ostensible impact of
these bold declarations was to raise the "democratic ideals of equality
and majority rule" to the status of constitutional requirements. 9 A
quarter-century later, this Comment will argue that the Court once
again may be forced to intervene, absent imminent reform by Congress
and state legislatures, in the realm of electoral participation, this time
to remedy the gross inequities that characterize the system of personal
registration in the United States.
In the 1988 general election, only 50.16% of eligible voters cast a
ballot, the lowest voter turnout rate since 1924.10 The turnout rate is
even lower in off-year elections."1 As these figures attest, there has been
a precipitous decline in voter turnout in the United States since 1960.12
Election scholars have proposed a myriad of possible reasons for the
decline in participation. Some critics attribute the decline to institutional causes, such as the decline of party competition." Others look to
of districting laws is discussed infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
' Reynolds, at 560-61 (finding this principle to have been clearly established in
Wesberry).
7 Id. at 561-62.
8 Id. at 562.
1 See id. at 565-66; cf. Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One
Vote-One Vote, One Value, 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 66-67 (arguing that the principle
of one person, one vote is a "logical and desirable concomitant" to the features of universal suffrage and representative assembly indicative of a democracy).
1" See 50.16% Voter Turnout Was Lowest Since 1924, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18,
1988, at A36, col. 1.
"1See Crotty, The Franchise:Registration Changes and Voter Representation, in
PATHS TO POLITICAL REFORM 67 (W. Crotty ed. 1980) (noting that ninety million
people did not vote in the off-year election in 1978); Squire, Wolfinger & Glass, Residential Mobility and Voter Turnout, 81 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 45, 45 (1987) (finding
that only one-third of the eligible electorate voted in the two years previous to the 1980
general election). In 1986, the turnout rule was 37.3%, the lowest for a congressional
election since 1942. See Voter Turnout is Estimated at 37.3%, Lowest Since 1942,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1986, at A8, col. 4.
12 See P. KLEPPNER, WHO VOTED? THE DYNAMICS OF ELECTORAL TURNOUT,
1870-1980, at 112-14 (1982); Crotty, supra note 11, at 71-72 & table 3.1. Turnout
figures for states electing statewide officeholders during this period parallel the trends
in presidential and congressional voting. See id. at 72.
" See, e.g., P. KLEPPNER, supra note 12, at 70-82 (finding the downturn in party
competition to be the most significant cause of electoral demobilization); Burnham, The
Changing Shape of the American Political Universe, 59 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 7, 22-23
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socio-psychological causes, such as the individual voter's level of education,' her sense of civic duty and obligation,1 5 or her sense of apathy
and alienation from the political system. 16 Finally, after almost a century of academic disinterest,1 7 scholars have begun to focus attention
upon voter registration and its effects on voter turnout.' 8
Roughly 35-40% of eligible Americans are not registered to vote. 9
Primarily due to nonuniform, archaic, and confusing state registration
standards, "Americans must face, and master, the most cumbersome
and restrictive registration practices of any country" in the free world.2"
(1965) (arguing that when the 19th century political order of "complete and intensely
party-oriented voting participation" was eroded after 1900, "turnout fell
precipitately").
14 See R. WOLFINGER & S. ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES? 23-26, 34-36 (1980); see
also A. CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE, W. MILLER & D. STOKES, THE AMERICAN VOTER
475-81 (1960) [hereinafter A. CAMPBELL] (noting the strong relationship between a
voter's education and her senses of "political efficacy" and "citizen duty," which are
harbingers of voter turnout).
15 See S. VERBA & N. NIE, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA: POLITICAL DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 125-37 (1972).
18 See A. HADLEY, THE EMPTY POLLING BOOTH 39-42 (1978).
17 See, e.g., Burnham, The Appearance and Disappearance of the American
Voter: An Historical Overview in THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE AMERICAN VOTER
125, 131 (1978) (noting the lack of critical literature on registration laws until the
1960s); Kelley, Ayres & Bowen, Registration and Voting: PuttingFirst Things First,
61 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 359, 359 (1967) (finding that until recently, most students of
voting have paid little attention to the subject of registration).
1 See, e.g., P. KIMBALL, THE DISCONNECTED (1972); F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD,
WHY AMERICANS DON'T VOTE (1988); Crotty, supra note 11; Kelley, Ayres &
Bowen, supra note 17; Rosenstone & Wolfinger, The Effect of Registration Laws on
Voter Turnout, 72 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 22 (1978); Stone, Voter Registration: Context
and Results, 17 URB. LAW. 519 (1985).
" Accurate figures of the number of registered voters are difficult to ascertain due
to flaws affecting each side of the percentage computation which would determine a
registration percentage. See Squire, Wolfinger & Glass, supra note 11, at 46. The
numerator-the number of votes cast-is somewhat low in that it excludes spoiled ballots, people who go to the polls but do not vote for a presidential candidate, and certain
write-in votes that are not counted. See id. However, the Census Bureau has found that
counting all such ballots would only increase turnout by 1-2%. See id. The denominator-the number of people registered to vote-is high in that it includes high numbers
of "deadwood" registrants (registered voters who have died or moved and have not been
purged from local rolls), persons claiming to be registered when in fact they are not,
and samples underrepresenting lower-income citizens whose registration rates are low.
See F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, supra note 18, app. A at 256-59. Factoring in these
variables, Piven and Cloward recalculated the Census Bureau's Current Population
Survey (Census Bureau/CPS) figures to come out with a 1984 national registration
level of 63-64%. See id. app. A at 258. Other commentators have come up with similar
figures. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 18, at 520 (finding the rate of unregistered Americans to number from 35-40%).
Mathematical calculations done by the author, based upon returns from the 1988
general election, see supra note 10 and accompanying text, yield a higher rate of nonregistered Americans: 40-43% of the eligible electorate. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
20 Crotty, supra note 11, at 69.
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The vast majority2" of states continue to maintain registration deadlines
of up to fifty days before an election,22 and authorize restrictive registration practices such as inconvenient registration sites and hours.2"
These practices have led many commentators and scholars to acknowledge that the requirement of personal registration in the United States
is at least one cause of low voter turnout.24
Critical legal analyses of the registration system in the United
States have demonstrated that contemporary registration laws could be
subject to successful equal protection and statutory challenges.2 5 This
2 Four states do not impose rigid registration deadlines. North Dakota does not
require registration. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-02 (1981). Three other states,
Maine, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, allow for election day registration. See ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 122(4) (Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 201.061(3) (West
Supp. 1989); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 6.29(2)(a) (West 1986 & Supp. 1988).
22 State registration deadlines range from five days in Utah, see UTAH CODE
ANN. § 20-2-6 (Supp. 1988), to the fifty day registration deadline in Arizona. See
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-120 (West Supp. 1988).
23 For a description of restrictive registration practices as well as their effects, see
infra notes 78-100 and accompanying text.
24 See, e.g., A. CAMPBELL, supra note 14, at 281-82 (noting correlation between
"restrictive" election laws and variability in voter turnout); K. PHILLIPS & P.
BLACKMAN, ELECTORAL REFORM AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 52-53 (1975) (though
disputing that federal registration reform would be a panacea for low voter turnout,
estimating that federally assisted national registration would increase turnout by 510%); F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, supra note 18, at 17-18 (maintaining that voter
registration procedures are the "linchpin" of the distorted rates of voter turnout); R.
WOLFINGER & S. ROSENSTONE, supra note 14, at 73 (projecting that reform of registration laws would increase national voter turnout by 9.1%); Burnham, The Turnout
Problem, in ELECTIONS AMERICAN STYLE 108 (A.J. Reichley ed. 1987) ("[F]irst-rate
empirical work has demonstrated that personal registration systematically reduces turnout."); Glass, Squire & Wolfinger, Voter Turnout: An International Comparison, 6
PUB. OPINION 49, 52-53 (Dec./Jan. 1984) (finding lower rates of voter turnout in the
United States than in Europe explained most easily by tougher registration procedures); Guinier, Keeping the Faith: Black Voters in the Post-Reagan Era, 24 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 418 (1989) (stating that registration requirements "primarily
serve to reduce voter participation among all citizens, especially minorities"); Kelley,
Ayres & Bowen, supra note 17, at 362 ("[R]egistration requirements are a more effective deterrent to voting than anything that normally operates to deter citizens from
voting once they have registered, at least in presidential elections.").
2 See, e.g., Note, Eradicating Racial Discrimination in Voter Registration:
Rights and Remedies Under the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 93, 109-22 (1983) [hereinafter Note, EradicatingRacial Discrimination]
(arguing that the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act create an affirmative duty
upon the states to excise election procedures, such as certain aspects of voter registration, that perpetuate the effects of past racial discrimination); Comment, Access to Voter
Registration, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 482, 494-518 (1974) (detailing possible
equal protection, due process, and fifteenth amendment challenges to registration laws
that burden the exercise of the franchise, especially as to minorities); Note, Voter Registration:A Restriction on the FundamentalRight to Vote, 96 YALE L.J. 1615, 1617-40
(1987) [hereinafter Note, Voter Registration] (arguing that registration laws are vulnerable under the fundamental rights strand of equal protection in that they do not
serve a "compelling state interest" nor employ the "least restrictive means").
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Comment goes one step further, arguing that the Court soon will be
forced to take affirmative action to rectify the infirmities that characterize the system of personal registration in the United States, similar to
the affirmative action taken by the Court in the early 1960s when confronted with gross malapportionment. Part I traces the history of registration laws in the United States to the present day, demonstrating that
such laws have had an inherent and continuing disenfranchising effect.
Part II notes that when confronted with another significant problem in
the electoral realm, that of gross malapportionment, the Court intervened to forge the principle of one person, one vote. It then identifies
two "critical features" of malapportionment that compelled judicial intervention: the rapid increase in inequality among districts over time,
and legislative self-interest in resisting districting reform. Part III demonstrates that these two "critical features" similarly are present in the
realm of voter registration. First, it notes that the rate of unregistered
Americans is downwardly spiralling over time, and will soon reach crisis proportions, if it has not done so already. Second, it argues that
Congress and state legislatures have a self-interest in rejecting registration reform, as legislators are loathe to redefine the electorate that voted
them into office. Part IV concludes by arguing that due to the unremedied presence of these "critical features," the Court soon will be
forced to intervene in the realm of voter registration. First, it reviews
the constitutional arguments that could serve as the underlying bases to
judicial intervention. Second, it argues that the Court must remedy the
infirmities of the present system of voter registration by requiring uniform voter enrollment by the government at regular intervals, thereby
transferring the burden of registration from the individual to the state.
I.

HISTORY AND EFFECTS OF REGISTRATION LAWS IN THE
UNITED STATES

Registration laws in the United States historically have denied
qualified voters equal access to the ballot. This Comment divides an
analysis of those laws into two parts. Part A traces the history and
disenfranchising nature of registration laws in the United States. Part
B analyzes registration laws currently in force, concluding that despite
reforms, such laws continue to inhibit many qualified voters from the
ballot.
A. History of Registration Laws in the United States
Most laws requiring the personal registration of voters in the
United States have been in existence only since the late nineteenth cen-
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tury.2" Prior to 1860, only a few New England states27 and certain
cities" required any form of registration.29 It was only as urbanization
increased geometrically during the mid-nineteenth century"0 that registration laws aimed at preventing voter fraud were passed in many
northern states, often with the law being applicable only to large cities.3 a Most of these early laws, however, did not require personal registration, and thus were ineffective at curbing voter fraud. 2
At the end of the nineteenth century, most states either introduced
or strengthened existing voter registration laws. 3 A key feature of these
new statutes was the requirement of personal registration, which
"shifted the burden of establishing eligibility from the state to the individual." 4 Although the ostensible goal of these strengthened registraSee Kelley, Ayres & Bowen, supra note 17, at 374.
27 Massachusetts enacted the first registration law in 1800. See J. HARRIS, REGISTRATION OF VOTERS IN THE UNITED STATES 65 (1929) (citing Acts and Laws of
Massachusetts, 1800, Ch. 74). The law requiring registration was upheld by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Capen v. Foster, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 485 (1832).
Connecticut and Maine also adopted early registration systems. See F. PIVEN & R.
CLOWARD,supra note 18, at 88 (citing R. CARLSON, THE EFFECT OF VOTER REGIS26
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1912-1924, at 105 (1976)).
2" Pennsylvania enacted a registration law in 1836 that was applicable to the city
of Philadelphia. See J. HARRIS, supra note 27, at 67 (citing 1835-36 Pa. Session Laws
436, 441-44, §§ 40-50). In 1840, a registration law was enacted in New York which
applied to New York City. See id. at 71 (citing 1840 N.Y. Session Laws Ch. 78 &
361). However, this law was repealed in 1842. A more limited registration law was
enacted by South Carolina in 1819, requiring registration in the city of Columbia for
the election of warden and intendant. See id. at 67 (citing 1819 S.C. Acts of the General Assembly, p. 16).
2'9See id. at 72; Converse, Change in the American Electorate, in THE HUMAN
MEANING OF SOCIAL CHANGE 263, 283 & n.34 (A. Campbell & P. Converse eds.
1972).
i
STATES,

This is not to suggest, of course, that there existed universal suffrage before registration laws were enacted. States had always possessed the power to proscribe voter
qualifications, which "typically concerned sex, age, place of residency, duration of residency, property, wealth, freeman status, and race." Comment, supra note 25, at 485.
Blacks were totally disenfranchised before the Civil War in all but six northeastern
states, see Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV.
523, 525 (1973), and were only guaranteed suffrage with the passage of the fifteenth
amendment in 1870. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV. Women were denied the franchise
until the passage of the nineteenth amendment in 1920. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
30 See, e.g., K. PHILLIPS & P. BLACKMAN, supra note 24, at 7 (noting that urbanization increased from 10 percdnt in 184,0 to almost 30 percent in 1880).
31 See J. HARRIS, supra note .27, at 72.! Harris provides a thorough review of the
advent and passage of registration aws in the states of New York, Pennsylvania, and
Illinois. See id. at 72-85.
2 See, e.g., id. at 65-66 (noting that "early registration laws were ineffective
against corrupt and powerful political machines"); Converse, supra note 29, at 283
(finding that absent personal registration, "ward heelers" drew up registration lists, so
fraud was not cured).
1
22 See J. HARRIS, supra note 27, at 65; Converse, supra note 29, at 283-84.
34 P. KLEPPNER, supra note 12, at 60, A related revision was the change from
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tion laws was to increase protection against vote corruption, 5 an illicit
goal was disenfranchisement, directed against blacks in the South and
new immigrants from southern and eastern Europe in the North and
Midwest.36 As one prescient commentator has noted, "[tihere are certain broad themes which link the origins of all such [registration] legislation together. To a very great degree, it was motivated by racism
")37

The new registration laws had a marked effect on voter turnout
rates throughout the nation. 8 In the South, most blacks and many poor
permanent registration to either periodic or annual registration. See F. PIVEN & R.
CLOWARD, supra note 18, at 90.
11 See, e.g., J. HARRIS, supra note 27, at 72 ("The extension of registration was
to come after the rapid growth of cities following the Civil War, the great influx of
immigrants, and the growth of cities following the Civil War, the growth in power and
corruption of the political machines . . ... "); P. KLEPPNER, supra note 12, at 58 (finding registration reform to be part of "a concerted and successful effort to rationalize and
regulate the conduct of elections and the role of political parties in the electoral
process").
A few commentators claim that progressive reform was the primary intent of the
new registration laws. See, e.g., Converse, supra note 29, at 286 ("[T]he idealistic
forces of reform, bent on cleaning up the fraud continuing to haunt voting process in
the United States, lent their weight to the demands of the cities for broader registration
control."); Rusk, Comment: The American Electoral Universe: Speculation and Evidence, 68 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1028, 1045 (1974) (arguing that the intended effect of
the new registration system was "to end vote corruption"). However, the strength of
this argument depends upon the actual prevalence of widespread vote fraud, a question
that is the focus of much scholarly debate. Compare Converse, supra note 29, at 282
(noting a widespread recognition of voter fraud in this period) and Rusk, supra, at
1032-33 (finding the existence of weak registration laws and the unofficial ballot, both
integral to vote corruption, to be expressly implemented by the political parties to control the vote) with P. KLEPPNER, supra note 12, at 59 (arguing that voter fraud was
episodic rather than routine) and Burnham, supra note 17, at 126 (rejecting as "unprovable" and "unreasonable" the notion of "universal corruption" of the voting
process).
36 See W. CROTTY, POLITICAL REFORM AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT 1516 (1977); K. PHILLIPS & P. BLACKMAN, supra note 24, at 7-8; F. PIVEN & R.
CLOWARD, supra note 18, at 78-95; Burnham, A Political Scientist and Voting-Rights
Litigation: The Case of the 1966 Texas Registration Statute, 1971 WASH. U.L.Q.
335, 336; Voting Rights Act: Runoff Primariesand Registration Barriers:Hearings
on the 1982 Amendments of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 Before the Subcomm. on
Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 136 (1985) [hereinafter Hearings on the 1982 Amendments] (testimony of Lani
Guinier, Head of the Voting Rights Litigation Project of the NAACP Legal Defense &
Educational Fund, Inc.).
Even commentators who profess that reform was the primary goal of the new
registration laws recognize that there also existed a disenfranchising intent in these
enactments. See, e.g., Converse, supra note 29, at 297 (stating that registration laws
were viewed as a means "to protect the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture from
further subversion by the hordes of new immigrants from southern and eastern Europe.
While 'morality' made a much finer platform than 'our culture is better than yours,'
the nativist implications of the reforms were widely perceived").
" Burnham, supra note 36, at 336.
Though some scholars argue that other forces were the primary cause of the
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whites were eliminated from voter rolls.39 Since the fifteenth amendment prohibited the overt disenfranchisement of blacks,40 the South utilized more sophisticated and oblique schemes. 4 ' In addition to personal
registration, southern states instituted an "interlocking network of legal
devices," 4' 2 including literacy tests, poll taxes, eight-box laws, and the
secret or "Australian ballot," to achieve disenfranchisement.43 Despite
the wide-spread use of these more sophisticated schemes, however, the
arbitrary administration of the registration system remained the primary mode of disenfranchisement.4 4 As one commentator has noted,
"[tlhe key disfranchising features of the southern registration laws were
the amount of discretion granted to the registrars, the specificity of the
information required of the registrant, the times and places set for registration, and the requirement that a voter bring his registration certif'4
icate to the polling place."

5

The effect of personal registration had a similar effect in the
North and the Midwest.46 Registration statutes passed in these areas
turnout decline at the end of the twentieth century, they nevertheless recognize the
disenfranchising effects of registration laws. Walter Dean Burnham, for example, argues that the fall in turnout was due to the collapse of intense party competition, especially after the 1896 election. See Burnham, supra note 13, at 22-23. However, Burnham acknowledges that "[t]he basic legal devices which were adopted-particularly the
device of personal registration-without question contributed to the massive decline in
voter participation after 1900." Burnham, supra note 17, at 141.
11 See, e.g., J.M. KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS 49-50 (1974)
(citing examples in South Carolina and Louisiana in which significant portions of the
black as well as white populations were disenfranchised); K. PHILLIPS & P.
BLACKMAN, supra note 24, at 8 (citing statistics demonstrating marked drops in voter
turnout in many southern states); Derfner, supra note 29, at 542 (noting that "[bilacks
were, with rare exceptions . . . wholly eliminated from the political process").
Harris details an example of this discrimination, in which a black attorney, a
graduate of Harvard, was denied registration in Mississippi by the precinct registrar (a
blacksmith) for failing to give a "reasonable" interpretation of the due process clause
after a discourse that demonstrated "considerable learning and ability." J. HARRIS,
supra note 27, at 157 n.24.
40 Section I of the fifteenth amendment to the United States Constitution reads:
"The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
41 A further reason for the more sophisticated schemes was the fact that methods
such as violence and fraud, aimed at keeping blacks as well as Republicans from the
ballot, threatened a return of federal intervention. See J.M. KOUSSER, supra note 39,
at 45-46; F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, supra note 18, at 79.
42 Burnham, supra note 36, at 336.
"' For a thorough review of the types and effects of these laws, see J.M.
KOUSSER,

supra note 39, at 45-72.

'" See, e.g., J. HARRIS, supra note 27, at 157 ("The Negro in the South has been
disfranchised largely through the arbitrary administration of registration rather than by
the literacy requirement and other suffrage qualifications.").
"

46

J.M.

KOUSSER,

supra note 39, at 48.

See Burnham, Rejoinder to Comments by Philip Converse and Jerrold Rusk,
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were directed primarily against the populations of urban areas, indicating a strong distrust of city political "'machines' and their ethnic clien' As time went on, however,
teles." 47
the laws were extended to smaller
cities and even some rural areas.4 These registration procedures were
"exceedingly expensive, cumbersome, and inconvenient, ' 49 and many
citizens who were only marginally involved in the voting process were
"priced out of the system" as the costs of participation had become too
great. 50
The Supreme Court was not immediately receptive to constitutional challenges to state registration laws. Indeed, the Court upheld
almost every statute with a disenfranchising effect for a period extending half a century.5" At the turn of the century, the Court rejected
five challenges to various state registration schemes, basing each decision on procedural grounds.52 The Court also upheld as constitutional
many restrictive election laws, including the poll tax,5 3 the literacy
test,54 and white primaries that were not mandated by the state.55
Gradually, however, the Court began to invalidate the more egregious election laws. As early as 1915, the Court struck down the use of
the grandfather clause, which had served to protect whites from being
68 Am. Pot.. Sci. REV. 1050, 1057 (1974); see also Burnham, supra note 36, at 336
(finding southern election schemes to be "paralleled in a less extreme form" in the
North).
4 Burnham, supra note 36, at 336-37.
4 See J. HARRIS, supra note 27, at 72.
4 Id. at 66.
P. KLEPPNER, supra note 12, at 60. In economic terms, "every rational man
decides to vote just as he makes all other decisions; if the returns outweigh the cost, he
votes; if not, he abstains." A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 260
(1957).
51 See Derfner, supra note 29, at 541. The only exceptions were registration
schemes whose applications were explicitly or "inescapably" limited precisely to blacks.
See id. at 541-42.
52 See Jones v. Montague, 194 U.S. 147, 153 (1904) (finding challenge to Virginia registration laws to be moot, as the election in which the plaintiffs wished to vote
had already taken place); Selden v. Montague, 194 U.S. 153, 154 (1904) (same); Giles
v. Teasley, 193 U.S. 146, 165-66 (1904) (denying review to an Alabama Supreme
Court decision that rejected a challenge to Alabama registration laws and practices);
Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 213-15, 225 (1898) (denying appeal of a criminal conviction by an all-white jury by plaintiff who charged that blacks had been intentionally excluded from jury duty by means of their intentional exclusion from voter
rolls); Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 657-58 (1895) (finding challenge to South Carolina registration laws to be moot, as the election in which the plaintiffs wished to vote
had already taken place); see also Derfner, supra note 29, at 539-41 (providing case
backgrounds).
" See Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937), overruled, Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Educ., 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
" See Lassiter v. Northampton Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
" See Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935), overruled, Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 644 (1944).
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disenfranchised by the literacy test.5 The Court also began to chip
away at the "most effective and simplest way of disfranchising
blacks"-the white primary.5 7 In 1927, the Court invalidated white
primaries ordered by the state; 58 then, in 1944, the Court outlawed the
white primary completely.5" Black registration in the South subsequently increased at a moderate rate throughout the early 1950s.06
With the downfall of the white primary, most southern states returned to the use of discretionary registration systems as the primary
means of discrimination. In "giving substantial discretion to the local
white registrar, who was .

. .

'a law unto himself in determining the

citizen's possession of literacy, understanding, and other qualifications,'
legislators could restrict black registration with a minimum of effort.""1
Other states turned to different means: Alabama adopted a state constitutional amendment, known as the Boswell Amendment, which mandated literacy and good character tests, among others,6 2 Mississippi enacted a double literacy and understanding test,"3 and Louisiana
implemented an organized effort to purge black voters from voter rolls
on the basis of technical registration infractions. 64 As a result of these
restrictive measures, progress in black registration in the late 1950s was
"limited at best." 5
The major advances in breaking down the barriers to the ballot
finally were forged in the 1960s. Through the sustained success of the
Civil Rights Movement, the Civil Rights Act of 1964"6 and, more im58 See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 357-68 (1915). The Court also invalidated an attempted modification of the grandfather clause in 1939. See Lane v.
Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
" Derfner, supra note 29, at 542.
'8 See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927).
Il See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944). The Court extended the rule
of Smith to prohibit racially restrictive pre-primary elections in Terry v. Adams, 345
U.S. 461 (1953).
eo See D. GARROW, PROTEST
VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965, at
6"

Id. at 8 (quoting V.0.

AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE

9 (1978).

KEY, SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION
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(1949)).
6" See id. The Boswell Amendment was subsequently ruled unconstitutional by a
three-judge district court panel, who found the Amendment to be designed to achieve
the goal of granting to local registrars the opportunity to discriminate, which they were
in fact doing. See Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.), affd mem. 336 U.S.
933 (1949).
63 See D. GARROW, supra note 60, at 9-10.
64 See id.
65 Id. at 10.
e See Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1982)).
For a discussion of the aims and effects of the Civil Rights Act, see Derfner, supra note

29, at 547-50.
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portantly, the Voting Rights Act of 196567 were enacted. Due in large
part to the effects of these affirmative congressional mandates, states
have substantially relaxed voter registration requirements since 1960.8
And when the Supreme Court declared the right to vote to be fundamental in Reynolds v. Sims, 6 9 it opened the door for the invalidation of
many of the more blatant disenfranchisement techniques. The Court
would ultimately strike down both the poll tax70 and durational residency requirements,7 1 and also would uphold congressional power to
72
proscribe literacy tests.
The abolition of such devices as the poll tax and the literacy test,
however, has not resulted in a substantial and sustained rise in registration rates; other impediments to the ballot have remained
67 See Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1982)). It is far beyond the scope of this Comment even to
attempt an analysis of the dramatic impact that the Voting Rights Act has had in the
last twenty-four years. Instead, the words of one voting rights commentator will have to

suffice:
The Act was an immediate success. The effects on voters, and registrars,
of suspending literacy tests and of installing federal examiners to register
voters in problem areas was electric. By 1967, the percentage of blacks
registered in the covered states has risen sharply, and has continued to rise
to the point where black registration is not far below white registration in
many parts of the South.

Derfner, supra note 29, at 552.
The fact that the Voting Rights Act was introduced in part as a response to violent
attacks by southern authorities on blacks and whites marching to secure voting rights
for all citizens, see A. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVF ACTION
AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 2 (1987), is a testament to the courage and tenacity
of all those involved in the Civil Rights Movement.
e See Burnham, supra note 24, at 109 & n.26.
69 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964).
70 See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 383 U.S. 663 (1966). The twenty-fourth
amendment, enacted in 1964, prohibited poll taxes in federal elections. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XXIV. Harper invalidated any remaining poll taxes in state and local
elections.
' See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972).
72 In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966), the Court upheld
a Voting Rights Act ban of literacy tests and similar devices for a period of five years in
areas of demonstrated past discrimination via Congress's fifteenth amendment enforcement power. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652-53 (1966), the Court upheld a similar Voting Rights Act provision that served to outlaw New York's requirement of literacy in English as a prerequisite to voting as it applied to Puerto Ricans
with certain education qualifications via Congress's fourteenth amendment enforcement
power. Finally, in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 131-34 (1970), the Court upheld
the constitutionality of a provision of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970
which banned the use of literacy tests in any state as a prerequisite to voting.
In upholding congressional power to proscribe literacy tests in these rulings, the
Court did not address their constitutional viability, thus distinguishing and not overruling Lassiter v. Northampton Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959), which had found
literacy tests to be constitutional.
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untouched."3

B.

Contemporary Registration Laws

Registration laws currently in force in the United States, though
not explicitly geared toward disenfranchisement, still retain many of
the features that earlier served to disenfranchise numerous Americans.
A few states have progressed from entirely rigid voter registration laws
and deadlines. North Dakota does not require registration, 4 and three
other states allow for election day registration.75 Twenty-one other

states and the District of Columbia allow for mail registration, 6 which
can serve as a means of increasing registration. These states remain
the exception, however, rather than the rule.
Forty-six states and the District of Columbia maintain registration
deadlines that can range up to fifty days before an election. 7 Such
deadlines prevent those citizens whose interest in an election peaks as
the election day approaches from casting a ballot, as by then it is likely
73 See Terchek, Political Participation and Political Structures: The Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 41 PHYLON 25, 26-27 (1980). In terms of black registration, Derrick Bell has noted that "[tihe ravages of the first disfranchisement of black voters
during the post-Reconstruction years remain apparent." D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND
AMERICAN LAW § 4.7, at 154 (2d ed. 1980).
"I See N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-02 (1981) (registration law repealed by 1951
N.D. Laws, ch. 264, § 3).
15 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 122(4) (West Supp. 1988); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 201.061(3) (West Supp. 1989); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 6.29(2)(a) (West
1986 & Supp. 1988).
Oregon recently repealed its election day registration law. It now requires registration 21 days before election, except in the case of those who moved to the state less
than 21 days before the election. See OR. REV. STAT. § 247.025 (1988).
78 See ALASKA STAT. § 15.07.050 (1988); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 303 (West 1977);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 2012 (1981); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1311(c)(2) (1981);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-16 (1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 48.3 (West Supp. 1988);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-2309 (1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116.045(4)(b) (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1982 & Supp. 1988); MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 3-1(c) (1986); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 201.061(1) (West Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-2-203 (1987);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-221(c) (1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19.31-6.3 (West Supp.
1988); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-210(1) (McKinney 1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3503.11(b) (Anderson 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 247.012(1) (1986); PA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 25, §§ 623-19.1(a), 951-17.1(a) (Purdon Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-2115 (1985); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 13.002 (Vernon 1986); UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 20-2-7(2) (Supp. 1988); W. VA. CODE § 3-2-41 (Supp. 1988); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 6.30(4) (West 1986).
" See Voter Registrationby Mail: Hearings on S. 1177 Before the Senate Comm.
on Post Office and Civil Service, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 369 (1975).
78 As noted supra note 22, Arizona maintains a fifty-day registration deadline.
The majority of the other forty-five states and District of Columbia mandate registration deadlines of twenty to thirty days before an election. See LEAGUE OF WOMEN
VOTERS EDUCATION FUND, EASY DOES IT: REGISTRATION AND ABSENTEE VOTING
PROCEDURES BY STATE (1984) (chart).
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too late to register.7 9 Compounding this problem is the fact that registration is often limited to a single central location in a county-often
the county courthouse 8°-during working hours.8 '
Another impediment to the franchise is the fact that whenever one
moves, "whether it is down the street, to a nearby town, or across the
country, it is necessary to register anew." 82 This requirement causes a
marked downturn in participation for mobile Americans who have
moved within the past two years.8 3 Furthermore, it serves as a linchpin
for abusive and partisan election practices aimed at excluding from the
polls those voters who have moved within the jurisdiction and unwit84
tingly failed to reregister.
Dual registration, the technique of requiring citizens to register in
two different jurisdictions (typically a county and a municipality) also
impedes registration. 5 Presently, only one state explicitly prohibits
71 See SUBCOMM. ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT: AFTER THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: REGIS-

Print 1984) [hereinafter REPORT: AFTER THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT; Rose, Citizen Participationin the Electoral Process:American Practice
in a European Perspective, in THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE AMERICAN VOTER,
supra note 17, at 177 app. C at 179; Squire, Wolfinger & Glass, supra note 11, at 45.
1o For many blacks in the South, the courthouse building is a "psychological barrier, for it stands as a symbol of the historic oppression of black people." REPORT:
AFTER THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, supra note 79, at 5. This fact is evidenced by the
testimonial of one southern voting rights activist: "I knew blacks and some whites,
when you say courthouse, they freeze up, they been scared off." Hand & Douglas,
Enough is Enough: Voting Rights Denied, 9 S.EXPOSURE 95, 95 (1981) (interview
with Geraldine Sawyer, mayor of a small, unincorporated southern residential
community).
1 See REPORT: AFTER THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, supra note 79, at 2-3. One
investigative study of registration practices in several states found that more than onehalf of the 300 registration offices investigated were not clearly identified, one-quarter
did not have convenient parking facilities, and more than one-half were not easily accessible by public transportation. See W. CROTTY, supra note 36, at 59 (citing figures
TRATION BARRIERS 5 (Comm.

from LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS EDUCATION FUND, ADMINISTRATIVE OBSTACLES

TO VOTING (1972)).

Squire, Wolfinger & Glass, supra note 11, at 46.
See id. at 46, 51-57. In fact, mobile Americans have been found to have a
turnout rate consistent with those socioeconomic groups least likely to vote-young people and the uneducated, see id. at 46, despite the fact that movers have the same levels
of civic virtue, such as interest in politics, attention to the campaign, concern about the
outcome, and political efficacy, as nonmobile Americans. See id. at 50, 61.
" An example of such abusive tactics occurred on the campus of the University of
Pennsylvania before the 1988 general election. Republican ward officials attempted to
exclude from voting almost 350 students who had changed campus residences between
school years and had failed to reregister. See 350 Votes Nullified by GOP: Registration
Rules Violated by Students, Daily Pennsylvanian, Nov. 8, 1988, at 1, col. 3. After an
"eleventh hour" appeal, however, an election judge allowed the students to vote. See
Students Allowed Votes After Being Disqualified, Daily Pennsylvanian, Nov. 9, 1988,
at 1, col. 4.
85 See Note, Eradicating Racial Discrimination, supra note 25, at 93 & n.6.
82

83

2374

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 137:2361

dual registration,"6 while several other states leave local officials discretion to invoke this requirement.8 7 Forty states and the District of Columbia also utilize "purge statutes" which, though necessary in some
form to ensure the integrity of the voting rolls, often remove previously
registered citizens who have already met the burden of registration but
who have failed to exercise the franchise within a given time period. 8
This confusing maze of registration laws requires a qualified voter
to ascertain (at a minimum) where and when to obtain the
registration form, how to fill it in, whether supporting documents are needed, what the deadline is, and whether a declaration of party affiliation is required. For even a motivated
citizen, these requirements present administrative obstacles
that are hard to overcome.8 9
Finally, similar to the situation existent when registration laws
were first enacted, the discretionary power granted to local registrars
often serves to impede registration rather than further it. 90 Many states
allow local registrars full discretion to establish satellite sites91 or to
extend polling hours.92 Many states also give the local registrar discretion to appoint deputy registrars;9" this practice results more often in
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 98.041 (West 1982).
See Note, EradicatingRacial Discrimination,supra note 25, at 93-94 n.7.
88 See Note, The Purging of Empowerment: Voter Purge Laws and the Voting
Rights Act, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 483, 550-51 app. A (1988) (listing notice
requirements and triggering periods required by state voter purge statutes).
89 Stone, supra note 18, at 522.
90 As noted supra note 44 and accompanying text, the key disenfranchising features of many registration laws at the turn of the century were the discretionary power
of the registrar and inconvenient times and places for registration, among others.
11 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:133(D) (West 1979); MD. ELEC. CODE
ANN. § 3-2(c)(1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.498(1)(2) (West Supp. 1988);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-2-111(a) (1985).
92 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:134(A)-(C) (West 1979 & Supp. 1988);
MD. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 3-2(a) (1986); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.498(1)-(2)
(West Supp. 1988); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-216.01 (1988); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25,
§ 951-16(a) (Purdon Supp. 1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-5-140 (Law. Co-op Supp.
1988); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 12.004(b) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.149 (Supp. 1988).
13 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 17-4-158 (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 98.271(1)(2)
(West Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-3-120(d) (Supp. 1988); IDAHO CODE § 34209(1) (1981); IOWA CODE ANN. § 48.4 (West Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21-A, § 102 (Supp. 1988); MD. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 3-10(a) (1986); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 51, §§ 22, 22A (Law, Co-op 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 115.143(2) (Vernon
Supp. 1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-208 (1988); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 293.505(2) (Michie Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:31-2 (West Supp. 1988);
OR. REV. STAT. § 246.250(1) (1986); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 951-5(a) (Purdon
1963); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-9-5(a) (1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-5-20 (Law. Co-op
Supp. 1988); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:591 (West Supp. 1988) (prohibiting
temporary deputy registrars and instead calling for immediate appointments to fill va8

87
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greater power to inhibit registration than in increases in the ease of
registration. 94 These limitations create a multitude of barriers for potential registrants, including conflicts between registration hours and
working hours, significant travel to registration sites, and continuing
intimidation by local registrars and officials.9 5 In fact, one investigative
study of registration practices in the states found local registrars "to be
basically unconcerned with the difficulties [of registration], to exercise a
great deal of discretion over what they could (or would) do, and to be
under no centralized supervision." 96
Registration requirements thus create a two-tiered election system
in the United States, one in which the first hurdle, registering to vote,
is "shrouded in obscurity" 97 and often difficult to overcome.9" As one
commentator has noted:
Prospective voters are not educated to deal with [registration
requirements]; their attention, like that of the media and of
the nation at large, focuses on the election and its outcome. . . . As a consequence, individuals have little knowledge of the two-tiered election process and little sensitivity to
cancies); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-12-201(d) (1985) (not permitting volunteers to serve
as deputy registrars); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.1-46(1) (1985) (prohibiting registrars from
actively soliciting specific registrants).
9" See REPORT: AFTER THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, supra note 79, at 3-4 (noting
several state and local practices that inhibit rather than foster registration).
9 See id. at 2-3; Crotty, supra note 11, at 92.
o Crotty, supra note 11, at 92 (utilizing findings from LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS EDUCATION FUND, ADMINISTRATIVE OBSTACLES TO VOTING (1972); see P. KIMBALL, supra note 18, at 297 ("The staffing of registration points is usually under the
control of local organizations who sometimes have special interest in excluding potential
new voters who might threaten the distribution of power."); Guinier, supra note 24, at
418 (noting that "many local officials treat the franchise as a privilege which the voter
must earn").
The United States Commission on Civil Rights has reported that "minority organizations and private citizens who have attempted to secure more flexible registration
procedures reported lack of cooperation or hostility on the part of registration officials."
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: UNFULFILLED GOALS 67 (1981). In terms of specific practices of local registrars that serve to

retard voter registration, the League of Women Voters Education Fund study found
that:
Only eleven percent of the local officials . . . published a voter information guide; 28 percent provided no training for poll workers; and in approximately thirty percent of the registration places where bilingual assistance was needed, local officials failed to provide that service. Election
officials clearly have the power to make registration and voting procedures
easier for citizens . . . by and large, they don't use it.

supra, at 8.
Squire, Wolfinger & Glass, supra note 11, at 45.
See Crotty, supra note 11, at 69-70.

LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS EDUCATION FUND,
08
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the types of demands it will make on them. 9
Simply put, in the United States, "registration is often more difficult
than voting."1 00
An analysis of the effects of the system of personal registration on
voters is enhanced by a comparison of participatory rates in the United
States with those of other western democratic nations. The United
States consistently ranks at the bottom of cross-section analyses of voter
turnout rates."' 1 Seventeen of twenty-four western nations studied, on
the other hand, had participatory rates that exceeded 75%.'02

The most apparent reason for this differential is the fact that in
other western democracies, voting is a collective responsibility in which
both the government and the individual citizen are involved in ensuring
universal participation in the political process.10 3 Voter registration in
these nations is either automatic, activated by citizen identity cards
and/or governmental records, or is initiated by governmental canvasses
of the electorate.10 4 Six nations in fact impose penalties upon
nonvoters.10 5 The United States is the only western nation that continues to follow the "obsolete" English practice of placing the entire burden of registration upon the individual.1 0 6
99 Id.
10 Rosenstone & Wolfinger, supra note 18, at 22. In the 1988 general election,
37% of nonvoters stated that they did not vote because they were not registered, by far
the most important reason given for nonvoting. See If Nonvoters Had Voted: Same
Winner, But Bigger, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21. 1988, at B16, col. 3; see also Crotty, supra
note 11, at 84 ("By far, the reason given by the greatest number in explaining their
nonvoting was registration. Taking the population of nonvoters as a whole, 82 percent
said the reason that they did not vote was that they were not registered.").
101 See, e.g., F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, supra note 18, at 5 (citing a Harvard/
ABC News Symposium which ranked the United States twenty-third out of twentyfour western nations); Crotty, supra note 11, at 75-77 (ranking the United States
twenty-second out of twenty-three western nations); Glass, Squire & Wolfinger, supra
note 24, at 50 (ranking the United States twenty-third out of twenty-four western
nations).
102 See sources cited id.
'03 See F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, supra note 18, at 17; R. TUXEIRA, WHY
AMERICANS DON'T VOTE: TURNOUT DECLINE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1960-1984,
at 112 (1987); Crotty, supra note 11, at 69.
104 See Glass, Squire & Wolfinger, supra note 24, at 52.
109 Australia, Belgium, Greece, and Italy impose some form of compulsory voting,
as do parts of Austria and Switzerland. See Powell, American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective, 80 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 17, 20 (1986).
10. See Crotty, supra note 11, at 69; Rose, supra note 79, at 179; Squire, Wolfinger & Glass, supra note 11, at 45. In Australia and New Zealand, citizens must take
the initiative to register, but they are legally required to do so and subject to fines or
other penalties for failing to do so. See Powell, supra note 105, at 21. Similarly in
France registration is ostensibly left to the voluntary initiative of citizens; however, they
are legally required to register in their community and to obtain identification cards,
which facilitates registration. See id.
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A common argument that attempts to explain the disparity in participatory rates between the United States and other western democracies holds that it is the result of higher levels of voter alienation and
apathy in the United States. Studies consistently have demonstrated,
however, that Americans' confidence and pride in their own governmental structure is unparalleled among western nations. 107 The sense
of civic virtue evidenced by American citizens is not limited solely to
registered voters. Studies show no difference between voters and
nonvoters in terms of their views of a civic duty to vote, or in views that
ordinary citizens have a say in what the government does. 08
The more likely explanation for the disparity in participation rates
between the United States and other western nations is the presence of
registration restrictions. In the United States, voter turnout is calculated
as the percentage of the voting-age population that casts a ballot on
election day. When voting rates are calculated based upon the percentage of registered citizens who voted, however, the rate of participation
in the United States is comparable to those of other western nations,
ranging between 85-89%.09
II.

ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE: JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN THE
REALM OF REDISTRICTING

In the early 1960s, the Supreme Court was faced with a similarly
monumental problem in the electoral realm that threatened the viability
of representative government-the existence of gross malapportionment
that had become "alarmingly large and senselessly erratic" throughout
the United States.1 1 Part II of this Comment analyzes the Court's in10' See, e.g., G. ALMOND & S. VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE 102 (1963) (finding
85% of Americans to be proud of their political institutions, compared with 46% of the
Britons, 7% of the West Germans, and 3% of the Italians); S. LIPSET & W. SCHNEIDER, THE CONFIDENCE GAP.410 (rev. ed. 1987) (finding the level of overall confidence
in American institutions to be second only to Ireland among western, democratic nations in a 1981 Gallup Poll). As one commentator has noted, "American political attitudes should ... facilitate more political participation than political attitudes in other
democracies." Powell, supra note 105, at 19.
108 See Ranney, Nonvoting is Not a Social Disease, 6 PuB. OPINION 16, 17
(Oct./Nov. 1983).
109 See, e.g., F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, supra note 18, at 19, app. B at 260-61
(noting Census Bureau/CPS and National Election Study (NES) studies of participatory rates of registered voters that range from a low of 84% to a high of 89% in
the 1980s); Glass, Squire & Wolfinger, supra note 24, at 52 (combining same studies
to find a participatory rate of 86.8%); Squire, Wolfinger & Glass, supra note 11, at 47
(same).

110

R. McKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF EQUAL REP-

38 (1965). The breadth and scope of malapportionment existent in the
United States in the early 1960s is set out infra notes 140-48 and accompanying text.
RESENTATION
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tervention in the "political thicket" in order to remedy malapportionment. Part A reviews the advent of one person, one vote from Baker v.
Carr... through Reynolds v. Sims." 2 It then discusses the qualitative
dimensions of the rule as applied in federal and state districting
schemes. Part B identifies two "critical features" of malapportionment
that compelled judicial intervention. First, it describes the rapidly worsening condition of malapportionment over time. Second, it notes that
legislative reform was not forthcoming in that legislators had a selfinterest in retaining, rather than reforming, districting schemes.
A.

The Rule of One Person, One Vote

1. Advent of One Person, One Vote
In 1962, after sixteen years of resisting equal protection challenges
to districting laws,"' the Supreme Court intervened in the realm of
redistricting in Baker, reflecting a realization of "the manifest need to
rectify gross malapportionment."" ' 4 Justice Brennan found that redistricting presented a justiciable question, stating that "U]udicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar, and it has been open to courts since the enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment to determine

.

. .

that a discrimination reflects

no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action."' 5 The Court
subsequently gave meaning to Baker a year later, holding in Gray v.
Sanders"6 that a statewide primary system that afforded greater
weight to ballots cast in rural areas than to those cast in urban areas
"1
112

369 U.S. 186 (1962).

377 U.S. 533 (1964).

3 The Supreme Court first rejected an equal protection challenge to a state's
districting plan in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). In Colegrove, the Court
found that the districting issue was "of a purely political nature and therefore not meet
for judicial determination." Id. at 552. Subsequently the Court summarily refused to
consider a number of other redistricting cases based upon the Colegrove rationale. See
Carpeneti, Legislative Apportionment. Multimember Districts and Fair Representation, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 666, 666 n.1 (1972) (analyzing pre-Baker redistricting litigation); Comment, supra note 3, at 191 n.46 (same).
In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), however, a unanimous Court
found that an Alabama act changing the boundaries of the City of Tuskegee from a
square to an "uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure," id. at 340, was violative of the fifteenth amendment if its effect was to deprive blacks of their right to vote. See id. at
347-48. Though Justice Frankfurter distinguished the fifteenth amendment analysis in
Gomillion from Colegrove and its progeny, the Court had in effect treated a redistricting case as justiciable. See Comment, supra note 3, at 192 & n.49.
"1
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13-2, at 1063 (2d ed. 1988).
"
Baker, 369 U.S. at 226 (emphasis in original).
116 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
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was unconstitutional.117 In prophetic language, Justice Douglas wrote
that "[tihe conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can only mean one thing - one
person, one vote."1 '
The Court's first explicit recognition of the principle of one person, one vote came in 1964. In Wesberry v. Sanders, 9 the Court
struck down a Georgia apportionment statute that had established a
congressional district with two to three times the population of other
districts in the state. 2 ° Writing for the majority, Justice Black concluded that "construed in its historical context, the command of Art. 1,
§ 2, that Representatives be chosen 'by the People of the several States'
means that as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional
election is to be worth as much as another's."12 1 The rule of one person, one vote was said to fulfill "[the] Constitution's plain objective of
making equal representation for equal numbers of people the fundamental goal for the House of Representatives."1 22 Notably, the Court
based its holding solely upon its article I, section 2 analysis; Justice
Black never reached the plaintiffs' claims that the statute violated the
1 23
fourteenth amendment.
Four months after the Supreme Court decided Wesberry, the
Court extended the rule of one person, one vote to the realm of state
117 See

id. at 376-81.
Id. at 381; see also id. at 382 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("Within a given constituency, there can be room for but a single constitutional rule-one voter, one vote.")
376 U.S. 1 (1964).
118

120

See id. at 2-4.

Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7-8 (citations omitted). Justice Harlan, in dissent, found
Justice Black's art. 1, § 2 argument to be historically inaccurate. See id. at 24 (Harlan,
J., dissenting). Justice Harlan argued that art. 1, § 2 was concerned with apportionment among states, rather than districting within the states. Districting within states
was left to Congress, based in the powers granted to it by art. 1, § 4. See id. at 34; see
also L. TRIBE, supra note 114, at § 13-3. 1064 n.8 (noting that Justice Black's argument is unconvincing in light of the evidence presented by Justice Harlan); Auerbach,
supra note 9, at 5 (finding Justice Harlan's argument to be "persuasive"); Kelly, Clio
and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 119, 135 ("To put the
matter bluntly, Mr. Justice Black, in order to prove his point, mangled constitutional
history.").
22 Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 18.
121 See id. at 8 n.10. Many commentators have criticized the Wesberry decision for
not deciding the case on equal protection grounds. See, e.g., Auerbach, supra note 9, at
5 (characterizing Justice Black's reliance upon art. 1, § 2 of the Constitution to be
"surprising" in light of the fact that the plaintiffs and Solicitor General as amicus
curiae had put forth an equal protection claim); Note, Beyond Wesberry: State Apportionment and Equal Protection, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 264, 265 (1964) (arguing that in
delimiting its decision to art. 1, § 2 grounds, the Court failed to establish controlling
principles for state legislative redistricting cases).
121
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legislative redistricting in Reynolds and its companion cases."" In
Reynolds, the Court held that Alabama's apportionment scheme violated the equal protection clause. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren stated that as "a basic constitutional standard," both
houses of a bicameral state legislature must be redistricted on the basis
25
of population in order to comport with the equal protection clause.
One person, one vote was a necessary rule; otherwise, "an individual's
right to vote for state legislators [would be] unconstitutionally impaired
when its weight is . . . diluted when compared with votes of citizens
126
living in other parts of the State.'

2.

Qualitative Dimensions

Though Wesberry and Reynolds were clear in their requirement of
population equality, they did little to specify the precise parameters of
the rule. The Court clarified the standard, however, in Swann v. Adams, 127 stating that no deviation from strict population equality was
allowable unless it was unavoidably "de minimis," or justified by "a
satisfactory explanation grounded on acceptable state policy."12 8
29 the Court tightened
In Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,1
the standard
further by striking down a Missouri redistricting plan that varied only
1.6% from mathematical equality." Justice Brennan's statement that
"the command of Art. I, § 2, . . . permits only the limited population
variances which are unavoidable despite a good faith effort to achieve
124 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). The companion cases to Reynolds
all received full opinions. See Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Colorado General Assembly, 377
U.S. 713 (1964) (invalidating Colorado's legislative districting scheme); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964) (invalidating Delaware's legislative districting scheme); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964) (invalidating Virginia's legislative districting
scheme); Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964)
(invalidating Maryland's legislative districting scheme); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377
U.S. 633 (1964) (invalidating New York's legislative districting scheme).
125 See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568. The Reynolds Court rejected any analogy between state legislative districting schemes and the federal legislative structure, stating
that "in establishing our type of federalism a group of formerly independent States
bound themselves together under one national government. . . .Political subdivisions
of States-counties, cities, or whatever-never were and never have been considered as
sovereign entities." Id. at 574-75. In two companion cases to Reynolds, the Court specifically invalidated state legislative schemes modeled after the federal system. See Lucas, 377 U.S. at 724-26, 738 & nn.31-32; Maryland Comm. for FairRepresentation,
377 U.S. at 671-72, 675 & n.21.
126
127

128
129
130

Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568.
385 U.S. 440 (1967).
Id. at 444 (emphasis in original).
394 U.S. 526 (1969).

See id. at 529 n.1. The largest deviation from the ideal was 3.13%, while the
ratio of the largest to the smallest district was 1.06 to 1.
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absolute equality, or for which justification is shown,"' '3 effectively
withdrew the de minimis standard endorsed only two years earlier in
Swann."32 In no case was this more evident than in Karcher v. Daggett, 3' where the Court invalidated a New Jersey congressional redistricting plan that varied only 0.6984% from mathematical equality.'
The Court was less stringent in the realm of state legislative redistricting. In Mahan v. Howell, 135 the Court concluded that the standard
of mathematical equality required by the equal protection clause was
less stringent than the standard required for congressional redistricting
under article I, section 2.13' The Court held that de minimis deviations
from population equality can be justified by legitimate state policies
applied in a consistent and nondiscriminatory fashion.'3 Since Mahan,
the Court has continued to apply this more lenient standard in state
legislative redistricting cases."3 8

B. "Critical Features" of MalapportionmentLeading to Judicial
Intervention
One commentator has noted that the redistricting cases involved
rights that were essential to the democratic process, and whose dimensions could not safely be left to elected representatives, who had a
vested interest in the status quo.' 39 This Comment argues much the
same principles, setting out two "critical features" in the districting
realm that compelled judicial intervention.
131 Id. at 531. Justice Brennan went on to note that the Missouri legislature had
rejected, without consideration, a plan which would have markedly reduced population
variances among the districts. See id. at 532.
131 See L. TRIBE, supra note 114, at § 13-5, 1070.
133

462 U.S. 725 (1983).

See id. at 727-28. The Karcher Court also rejected the proposition that population deviances would be per se valid if less than the known statistical imprecision of
available census data. See id. at 735.
134

135

410 U.S. 315 (1973).

131 See id. at 322.
137 See id. at 324-25.
138 See, e.g., Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 848-49 (1983) (O'Connor, concurring) (upholding a Wyoming state legislative redistricting plan with a population
variance of 89% between the largest and smallest districts, on the grounds that Wyoming's "longstanding policy of preserving county boundaries" was legitimate); Gaffney
v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 737, 740-41 (1973) (upholding a Connecticut state legislative districting plan with deviations between districts of up to 7.83%, finding them not
sufficient to support a prima facie case of invidious discrimination). But see Board of
Estimate v. Morris, 109 S. Ct. 1433, 1438-43 (1989) (holding a deviation of 78%
among the New York City Board of Estimates to be inconsistent with the rule of one
person, one vote).
139 See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 117 (1980).
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1. Increasing Scope of Malapportionment
Malapportionment in the United States, at both the congressional
and state district levels, grew increasingly severe during the early
1960s. The 1950s had witnessed enormous shifts of population both
within and among the states: sixteen states lost between one and three
seats in Congress, while nine others gained up to eight seats.14 ° Although states that redistricted after the 1960 census more closely approximated population equality, those that did not manifested substantial inequalities in district populations and exhibited distinct urbanrural patterns. 41 These factors contributed to a considerable overall dilution of metropolitan strength in most states and in the House of Representatives as a whole. 42
At the state level, both restrictive constitutional provisions conditioning representation of counties or other subunits on factors other
than population and legislative failure to redistrict ensured that urban
and suburban areas similarly were grossly underrepresented. 14 3 Only
six states were districted so that a minimum of forty percent of the
state's population was needed to elect a majority in each house of the
legislature, while in thirteen states, one-third or less of the population
could elect majorities in both houses.1 44 Thus, over the course of the
twentieth century, increasing population growth and the constant fluidity of the population's composition and location greatly exacerbated dis1

trict malapportionment.

45

An important consideration that underlay the Court's arrival at
the principle of one person, one vote was the fact that it was the only
judicially manageable standard capable of resolving the increasingly se140

See G.

BAKER,

THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLuTIoN

72-73 & Table 7

(1966).
141 See id. at 78 (describing the urban-rural pattern as the universal presence
within a state of overpopulated typically urban or suburban districts and underpopulated typically rural or small-town districts).
142 See id. Even states that had redistricted after the 1960 census often experienced dilution of metropolitan voting strength. For example, Arizona's First Congressional District, which encompassed the City of Phoenix, contained a population of
663,510, while the rural Third Congressional District had only 198,236 inhabitants.
See id. at 73 (Table 7).
141 See id. at 25 (citing population figures and relative representational power
patterns within states from I P. DAVID & R. EISENBERG, DEVALUATION OF THE
URBAN AND SUBURBAN VOTE 9 (1961)). It is true, however, that malapportionment

was caused in some states by state constitutions that either required each county to be
assured of at least one representative, or that no county should have more than one

representative for each chamber. See R. MCKAY, supra note 110, at 49.
144 See G. BAKER, supra note 140, at 32 (citing figures set forth in

NATIONAL
MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, COMPENDIUM OF LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT (1962)).
146

See Auerbach, supra note 9, at 68.
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vere malapportionment problem. The bold action of mandating one
person, one vote was, as one commentator noted, "an effort by the
Court to solve a national problem which was assuming crisis proportions . . ."146
The scheme of decennial redistricting urged by the Court in Reynolds was geared specifically at combining the requirement of mathematical equality with an automatic adjustment process, thus facilitating
the goal of equal legislative representation notwithstanding the growth
and fluidity of the nation's population. 47 While not declaring decennial
redistricting to be a constitutional requisite, the Reynolds Court urged
that "compliance with such an approach would clearly meet the minimal requirements for maintaining a reasonably current scheme of legislative representation," and warned that "if reapportionment were accomplished with less frequency, it would assuredly be constitutionally
suspect."' 4 8
2. Legislative Self-Interest in Resisting DistrictingReform
Political realities in the United States also frustrated malapportionment reform. In Baker, the Court noted that in the more than sixty
years since the 1901 adoption of a previous districting scheme, all proposals for redistricting in both Houses of the General Assembly had
failed. 4 9 In simple terms, "[s]tate legislators who completely understood the growing disparities in population representation were also
those who had the most to gain from not calling attention to the
fact."' 5 0 Legislators at both the federal and state levels had derived
their power from existing districting schemes and thus were loathe to
threaten their political viability by tampering with the status quo.' 5 '
Political realities only perpetuated the malapportionment in the nation.
The Court's action in formulating the one person, one vote rule
thus nullified the problem of the political intransigence that so characterized state legislative action in the redistricting context. As one com146 Id.
147

at 70.

See id. at 12, 68-69.

Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 583-84.
See Baker, 369 U.S. at 191 & n.10.
160 R. McKAY, supra note 110, at 38.
1"1 See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 139, at 121 (stating that legislators had a selfinterest in "maintaining whatever apportionment . . . that got and keeps them where
they are); R. McKAY, supra note 110, at 38 (noting that due to legislative self-interest
in retaining the status quo, "the resulting conspiracy of silence was understandable");
L. TRIBE, supra note 114, at § 13-3, 1064 n.9 (criticizing Justice Harlan's dissent in
Wesberry for not addressing the probability that "legislators who had achieved their
positions through malapportionment would be unlikely to remedy such electoral
schemes").
148
149
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mentator has noted:
[T]he essence of our constitutionalism [is] that 'all forms of
organized power over men's wills should in some way be accountable to serve ends of broader concern than the purposes
of power holders.' It is this constitutional ideal that is being
violated by self-interested legislators when they refuse to reapportion equitably. Only the Court could vindicate it.152
Absent action by the Court, the political realities that impeded districting reform would have continued to pervade the constitutional system.
III.

THE PRESENCE OF "CRITICAL FEATURES" IN THE REALM OF
VOTER REGISTRATION

This Comment has argued that the "critical features" in the electoral realm of a rapid and worsening condition over time and legislative
self-interest in resisting reform compelled the Supreme Court to intervene in the "political thicket" of redistricting. Part III of this Comment
demonstrates that these "critical features" similarly are present in the
realm of voter registration. Part A demonstrates that registration is on a
rapid, downward spiral in the United States. It then notes that poor,
young, and minority citizens suffer most from these voting restrictions.
Part B argues that legislative resistance to the reform of voter registration laws is rooted in the fear of redefining the contours of the electorate from which they were voted into office.
A.

The Downward Spiral of Voter Registration

The presence of registration laws in the United States clearly
presents significant barriers to the exercise of the franchise for many
citizens. A more stark reality, however, is that the rate of registration in
the United States is entrenched in a continuous downward spiral. And
as voter registration drives generally have proved ineffectual at curbing
the nonregistration spiral,15 these figures only show signs of
mushrooming.15 In the 1988 general election, 91,602,291 Americans,
or 50.16% of those eligible to vote, cast a ballot.1 55 Utilizing these
152

Auerbach, supra note 9, at 70 (quoting J. HURST, JUSTICE HOLMES ON LE-

GAL HISTORY 29 (1964)).
153 See, e.g., P. KIMBALL, supra note 18, at 290-91 (noting that voter registration
drives, despite some "spectacular successes," generally have not proven effectual).
'" See W. CROTTY, supra note 36, at 52 (predicting that there would be 122
million nonvoters in the United States by the year 2000).
155 See 50.16% Voter Turnout Was Lowest Since 1924, supra note 10, at A36,

col. 1.
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figures, a series of mathematical calculations finds that between 40-43%
of all eligible Americans were not registered to vote on election day., 5,
In absolute terms as well, the numbers are striking-roughly seventy1 57
five million Americans were not registered to vote on election day. If
one presumes that the turnout rate will continue to fall, as it has done
precipitously since 1960,158 it is logical to presume further that there
will be a corresponding decline in the registration rate. This downward
spiral of registration could ultimately provoke a situation in which
more than fifty percent of eligible American voters are not registered to
vote, or in which more Americans were not registered than voted in a
presidential election.
This spiral is especially extreme in its impact upon minorities, the
young, and the urban poor. 5 As the United States Commission on
Civil Rights noted in 1981, "given the depressed economic status of
many minority communities, restrictive registration practices are espe158 These findings are based upon a number of basic cross-multiplication calculations. 91,602,291 Americans voted in 1988, representing 50.16% of the eligible populace. See id. In the "percentage fraction" then, 50.16% would be the numerator (the
percentage of citizens who actually voted in the 1988 election) and 100% would be the
denominator (the percentage of citizens eligible to vote in the 1988 election). This fractional equation would be equal to the "real number fraction," which would have
91,602,291 as the numerator (the number of citizens who actually voted in the 1988
election) and the unknown number of citizens eligible to vote in the 1988 election as the
denominator. By multiplying the numerator of the "real number fraction" (91,602,291)
with the denominator of the "percentage fraction" (100%), and then dividing the result
by the numerator of the "percentage fraction" (50.16%), one would find a "real number fraction" denominator of 182,620,197-the number of voters eligible to vote in the
1988 election.
Studies have demonstrated that somewhere between 85% and 88% of all registered
voters do in fact vote. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. It therefore is possible to approximate closely the number of unregistered Americans by utilizing another
series of cross-multiplication equations. Using the conservative estimate that 85% of
registered Americans actually voted over 100%, one would find that there were
107,767,401 registered Americans and 74,852,706 nonregistered citizens on election
day, the latter representing roughly 40% of the number of citizens eligible to vote. The
more liberal estimate that 88% of registered voters did in fact vote finds that there were
104,935,125 registered Americans on election day and 78,526,684 nonregistered citizens, the latter comprising roughly 43% of the eligible electorate.
See figures cited id.
158 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. As one commentator has noted, "[i]f
qualifications remain as they are, there is no reason to believe that turnout will improve over the next several decades." W. CROrry, supra note 36, at 52.
159 See, e.g., W. CROrTY, supra note 36, at 53-55 & Table 2.1 (demonstrating
that far fewer blacks and Hispanics register than do whites); P. KIMBALL, supra note
18, at 289 ("The phenomenon of nonparticipation exists throughout the country, but is
most prevalent within those segments of the population most disconnected . . . .[t]he
urban poor, the young, Blacks, Mexican-Americans, the American Indian . . .); Williams & Morris, Is the Electoral Process Stacked Against Minorities?, in ELECTIONS
AMERICAN STYLE, supra note 24, at 139 (noting that registration requirements disproportionately disadvantage minorities).
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cially burdensome." ' Voter participation has always been strongly related with socioeconomic factors, especially education and income; as a
result, minority groups and the poor have experienced lower rates of
participation. 1 ' This problem is exacerbated by a younger population,
notorious for their low levels of participation, in urban minority communities."6 2 Thus, minorities and the poor, who have in effect have
"the largest stake in social change," remain disproportionately disconnected from the political process. 6 ' The inherent defects in American
registration laws have culminated in a "critical point" for these
groups,"6 in which the right to vote often is no longer a fundamental
right of citizenship.
B.

Legislative Self-Interest in Resisting Registration Reform

Political realities also dictate that judicial action be taken in the
realm of registration. Many legislators at both the federal and state
level have derived their power from existing levels of citizen participation, and may be loathe to change the status quo and thereby threaten
their political future.' 6

5

As one set of commentators has noted:

Both Congress and the state legislatures - and, in fact, most
practicing politicians - fear the impact of drastic registration changes that would redefine the electorate by substantially increasing its numbers. Politicians are content to maintain an electorate they understand and with which they have
had success. Self-interest favors retention of the familiar and
160

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS,

supra note 96, at 66. Lani

Guinier specifically has noted that registration requirements discriminate, as "private
resources such as cars and telephones, which are critical to functioning in this two-step
process, are unavailable to poor people, especially racial and language minorities."
Guinier, supra note 24, at 419.
161 See, e.g., W. CROTTY, supra note 36, at 53 (noting that "[tihe young, blacks,
the least educated, the unemployed, blue collar workers . . . are the people least likely
to be part of the electorate"); P. KIMBALL, supra note 18, at 16-17 ("Voter participation has always exhibited a high correlation with education and income, two spheres of
urban disadvantage.").
162 See P. KIMBALL, supra note 18, at 16-17.
163 Id. at 289; see Crotty, supra note 11, at 77-78 (noting that "those left out of
the active electorate are the ones least able to afford it").
16
REPORT: AFTER THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, supra note 79, at 6.
166 See Crotty, Introduction: Political Reform in the Late Twentieth Century, in
PATHS TO POLITICAL REFORM,

supra note 11, at xviii ("Many elective office holders

fear the redefinition through registration reform of an electorate with which they now
feel comfortable."); see also Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A PoliticalParty Perspective on
Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1567, 1573 &
n.13 (1988) (detailing legal scholarship which argues that legislators often act in their
own self-interest, rather than attempt to further the public interest).
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the safe. 6'
One reason for the resistance to registration reform has been opposition by Republican and southern Democratic legislators who fear an
increase in the "liberal" electorate.167 Most social scientists believe,
however, that the increase in participation through registration reform
68
would generally be insensitive to partisan dynamics.1
Presently, there are eight bills before Congress that aim to reform
the system of personal registration through various means. 169 Some of
166 W.

CROTTY

& G.

JACOBSEN, AMERICAN PARTIES IN DECLINE 19

(1980).

1'7 See Crotty, supra note 11, at 78; Rosenstone & Wolfinger, supra note 18, at

37.

168 See, e.g., Converse, The Concept of a Normal Vote, in A. CAMPBELL, P. CONMILLER & D. STOKES, ELECTIONS AND THE POLITICAL ORDER 29 (1966)
(noting the "general insensitivity of partisanship to large changes in turnout"); Crotty,
supra note 11, at 78 (noting that "[miost nonvoters are too apolitical to swell the ranks
of liberals or Democrats, as many contend they would. . . . The majority of nonvoters
are open to persuasion by either party; they are tied to neither"); Rosenstone & Wolfinger, supra note 18, at 38 ("[T]he expanded electorate produced by relaxing registration laws would be remarkably similar to the smaller, actual electorate."); Squire,
Wolfinger & Glass, supra note 11, at 61 (determining through statistical analysis that
the changes in partisan and ideological identification as a result of registration reform
would not be statistically significant).
A New York Times/CBS Poll conducted after the 1988 general election supported
these arguments, finding that if the election had had a turnout of 100%, George Bush's
victory margin would have been even greater than it was in the actual election. See If
Nonvoters Had Voted: Same Winner, But Bigger, supra note 100, at B16, col. 3.
16 See S. 874, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) ("National Voter Registration Act of
1989") (introduced by Senator Ford) (establishing national voter registration procedures for presidential and congressional elections); S. 675, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989) ("Equal Access to Voting Act of 1989") (introduced by Senator Cranston)
(eliminating discriminatory barriers to voter registration); H.R. 2811, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1989) ("Postal Service Voter Registration Facilitation Acts of 1989) (introduced
by Representative Leland) (providing space in post offices for state registration authorities to place voter registration forms); H.R. 2810, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) ("Postal Service Voter Registration Facilitation Acts of 1989) (introduced by Representative
Leland) (providing that the Postal Service give voter registration forms along with
change-of-address forms); H.R. 2190, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (introduced by
Speaker Foley) (establishing national voter registration procedures for elections for federal office); H.R. 983, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) ("Jury Selection and Voter Participation Act of 1989") (introduced by Representative McMillen) (amending title 28,
U.S.C., to provide that grand and petit juries be selected from sources other than voter
registration lists); H.R. 17, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) ("Universal Voter Registration Act of 1989") (introduced by Representative Conyers) (establishing national voter
registration procedures for elections for federal office); H.R. 15, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989) ("National Voter Registration Act of 1989") (introduced by Representative
Swift) (same). One other bill, introduced by Senator Moynihan, S. 214, would have
the Department of Health and Human Services establish a counterfeit-free Social Security card that could eventually be used as a voter registration card. See S. 214, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
The presentation of these differing bills should not be interpreted as an assertion
that they are identical, or equally progressive in terms of registration reform. It is
beyond the scope of this Comment, however, to put forth an in-depth analysis of proviVERSE, W.
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the bills are "incrementalist" reforms, representing modest plans aimed
at requiring or persuading states to incorporate changes into electoral
procedures in order to increase registration, while others are "bigbang" proposals, aimed at fundamentally altering traditional registration practices.1 7 0 It is likely, however, based upon the fate of similar
bills, that to the extent these proposals contemplate significant reform
of the registration process consistent with universal enrollment, none
will be passed, let alone reach the House or Senate floor. Congress
recently has rejected or failed to act upon numerous bills that have attempted to remedy defects in the system of personal registration. 17 1 In
fact, congressional attempts to reform the registration process have been
resisted since the early 1970s.72 Furthermore, as the legislative process
sions of the various bills.
170 See Crotty, supra note 11, at 97-98.
...In addition to the bills presently before the 101st Congress, see supra note 169
and accompanying text, a number of similar bills have been introduced in the previous
two Congresses, all failing to reach the floor of the House or Senate. See, e.g., S. 2061,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) ("Universal Voter Registration Act of 1988") (establishing national standards for elections for federal office); H.R. 3950, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1988) ("Universal Voter Registration Act of 1988") (same); S. 1888, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987) ("Universal Voter Registration Act of 1987") (same); S. 1405, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) ("Voter Registration Act of 1987") (amending title 39, U.S.C.,
to provide that change-of-address forms submitted to the Postal Service be furnished to
the appropriate state authority for voter registration purposes); H.R. 3666, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) ("Universal Voter Registration Act of 1987") (establishing national standards for voter registration); H.R. 3023, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)
("Voter Participation Act of 1987) (providing for election day and mail registration for
federal elections); H.R. 2750, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) ("Voter Registration Act")
(amending title 39, U.S.C., to provide that change-of-address forms submitted to the
Postal Service be furnished to the appropriate state authority for voter registration purposes); S. 1439, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) ("Voter Registration Act of 1985")
(same); S. 1420, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) ("Postage Free Election Material")
(amending title 39, U.S.C., to provide that voter registration forms, among others, be
mailed by election authorities free of postage); H.R. 2216, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985)
("Free Postage Election Participation Act") (amending title 39, U.S.C., to provide that
voter registration forms, among others, be mailed by election agencies free of postage);
H.R. 1668, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) ("Voter Registration Act of 1985") (amending
title 39, U.S.C., to provide that change-of-address forms submitted to the Postal Service
be furnished to the appropriate state authority for voter registration purposes); H.R.
1454, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) ("Registration Deadline Elimination Act of 1985")
(protecting the voting rights guaranteed by the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments by
preventing inappropriate registration procedures); H.R. 1453, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985) ("Postcard Registration Act of 1985) (protecting voting rights by eliminating
certain barriers to participation in federal elections).
172 In the early through mid 1970s, there also were numerous bills aimed at reforming the registration process that either went down to defeat or were not acted
upon. For a mere sampling of the numerous bills that were so proposed, see, e.g., S.
1072, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) ("Universal Voter Registration Act of 1977") (establishing a universal voter registration program); H.R. 5400, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977) ("Universal Voter Registration Act of 1977") (same); H.R. 11552, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1976) ("Voter Registration Act") (establishing a Voter Registration Administration in the Federal Election Commission for purposes of administering a voter regis-
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tration program through the Postal Service); S. 1177 94th Cong. 1st Sess. (1975)
("Voter Registration Act") (amending title 13, U.S.C., to establish within the Census
Bureau a Voter Registration Administration for the purpose of administering a voter
registration program through the Postal Service); H.R. 6079, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975) ("States Voter Registration Act") (amending the Federal Election Commission
Act of 1971 to establish within the Federal Election Commission a Voter Registration
Bureau for the purpose of assisting states in improving voter registration programs);
H.R. 4093, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) ("Voter Registration Act") (amending title 13,
U.S.C., to establish within the Census Bureau a Voter Registration Administration for
the purposes of administering a national voter registration program through the Postal
Service); H.R. 1686, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) ("Voter Registration Act") (establishing a Voter Registration Administration in the General Accounting Office for purposes of administering a voter registration program through the Postal Service); S. 472,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) ("Voter Registration Assistance Act of 1973") (amending
title 13, U.S.C., to establish a Voter Registration Administration in the Census Bureau
to carry out a program of financial assistance to the states to encourage and assist
voter registration); S. 352, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) ("Voter Registration Act")
(amending title 13, U.S.C., to establish a Voter Registration Administration in the
Census Bureau for the purposes of administering a voter registration program through
the Postal Service); H.R. 8053, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) ("Voter Registration Act")
(same); H.R. 4846, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) ("National Registration Rights Act of
1973") (amending the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to safeguard the constitutional and
civil liberties of American citizens with regard to lawful guarantees of participation in
the democratic process); H.R. 580, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) ("Voter Registration
Act") (amending title 13, U.S.C., to establish within the Census Bureau a National
Voter Registration Administration for the purpose of administering a voter registration
program through the Postal Service); S.3420, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) ("Voter Registration Assistance Act of 1972") (amending title 13, U.S.C., to establish a Voter
Registration Administration in the Census Bureau to carry out a program of financial
assistance to the states to encourage and assist voter registration); S.2574, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971) ("National Voter Registration Act") (amending title 13, U.S.C., to
establish in the Census Bureau a National Voter Registration Administration for purposes of a voter registration program through the mail); S.2457, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971) ("Universal Voter Registration Act of 1971") (establishing a system of universal
voter registration for federal elections); S.2445, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) ("National
Federal Voter Registration Act of 1971") (providing for nationwide registration of voters for federal offices); S.1199, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) ("Universal Enrollment Act
of 1971") (amending title 13, U.S.C., for Census Bureau to undertake a quadrennial
enrollment of voters for presidential elections who meet all state qualifications except
residency); H.R. 12016, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) ("Canvass of the Election Process") (amending title 13, U.S.C., to have Census Bureau establish a program of electoral canvassing); H.R. 10442, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) ("Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1971") (establishing a system of automatic voter registration); H.R.
6088, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) ("Universal Enrollment Act of 1971") (amending
title 13, U.S.C., for Census Bureau to undertake a quadrennial enrollment of voters for
presidential elections who meet all state qualifications except residency); S.4238, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) ("Universal Enrollment Act of 1970") (amending title 13,
U.S.C., by authorizing the Secretary of Commerce through the Census Bureau to undertake a quadrennial enrollment of those persons that meet the qualifications of the
various states other than residency for presidential elections); H.R. 19010, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1970) ("Universal Enrollment Act of 1970") (same).
Of these proposals, a bill proposed by Senator Gale McGee of Wyoming came the
closest to passage. That bill, S.2574 was reported favorably out of committee in 1972
but failed to win passage in the Senate by a 46-42 vote. See 118 CONG. REC. 8450
(1972). Its successor bill, S. 352, won passage in the Senate by a 57-37 vote in 1973,
see 119 CONG. REC. 14,877 (1973), but lost in the House on a procedural vote by seven
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inherently favors incremental rather than broad-scale reform, 17 even if

reform legislation were to be passed, it would not likely achieve anything of fundamental consequence.

17

This is not to say that all or even most legislators who oppose
registration reform do so consciously for these reasons. Instead, it is
simply enough, as the Court implied when faced with malapportionment in Baker v. Carr,15 that a worsening electoral infirmity is present, that viable reform proposals have been put forth, and that legislators have a self-interest in resisting these reforms.17 1 Judicial
intervention thus is appropriate in the registration realm due to legislative inaction at both the federal and state levels in reforming voter registration laws.
IV.

JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN THE REALM OF VOTER
REGISTRATION

The diminishing numbers of eligible citizens who register and vote
in the United States portends danger. As one commentator has noted
bluntly, "[t]he foundations of the American government do appear in
some jeopardy. People are participating less in the most basic form of
political involvement, voting. This development cannot be a healthy
sign for a governing system that depends on the support of its citizenry.'

I7 7

Part IV of this Comment argues that absent registration re-

form, the Supreme Court soon will be forced to remedy the system of
personal registration in the United States. Part A sets out potential constitutional challenges to registration laws that would serve as the basis
for judicial intervention. Part B then argues that the Court must mandate that the state undertake the responsibility for the uniform enrollment of voters at regular intervals in order to remedy the "critical features" that characterize registration laws.
votes in 1974. See K. PHILLIPS & P.
171

BLACKMAN,

supra note 24, at 61.

See Crotty, supra note 11, at 100.

174 See Crotty, supra note 165, at xviii.

"- 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
176 In Baker, the Court simply noted that all proposals for redistricting reform

had been defeated by the Tennessee General Assembly. See id. at 191 & n.10. In
making this notation, however, the Court implied that state legislators could not be
trusted to bring the state's districting scheme into conformity with the Constitution.
This distrust stemmed from the Court's recognition of legislative self-interest in impeding districting reform. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
117 Crotty, supra note 11, at 67; see P. KIMBALL, supra note 18, at 289 ("The
moral legitimacy of government is weakened when so many in nominal control of a
system of self-government are so obviously not involved in its electoral rituals.").
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A.

Potential Constitutional Challenges to Registration Laws

States are empowered under the Constitution to establish reasonable voter qualifications," 8 and to set "[t]he Times, Places, and Manner
of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives. 17 9 Consequently, the Supreme Court has upheld some restrictions of the right to
vote, such as minimum age, 8 ° citizenship, 81 and residency requirements. 8 2 The Court also has implicitly recognized registration restrictions to be legitimate limitations on the right to vote. In Anderson v.
Celebrezze,18 3 the Court noted:
We have recognized that, 'as a practical matter, there must
be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair
and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to
accompany the democratic processes.' To achieve these necessary objectives, States have enacted comprehensive and sometimes complex election codes. Each provision of these
schemes, whether it governs the registrationand qualifications of voters . . . inevitably affects-at least to some degree-the individual's right to vote and his right to associate
with others for political ends. Nevertheless, the State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify
reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions. 8
The Court thus found in Anderson that some voting restrictions that
178 Article I, Section 2 reads: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of
Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors
in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous
Branch of the State Legislature." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl.
1.
179 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. In fact, the states could choose to fill public
offices by appointment if they so desired. See Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party,
457 U.S. 1, 8-12 (1982).
180 See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124-31 (1970). In Mitchell, though
upholding congressional power to lower the minimum age of voters in federal elections
from 21 to 18, the Court upheld the power of states to set minimum age requirements
in state and local elections. The twenty-sixth amendment, adopted after the Court's
holding in Mitchell, now guarantees that "[t]he right of citizens of the United States,
who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of age." U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
However, Mitchell still stands for the proposition that states have the power to set
minimum age requirements for voting, so long as such requirements fall within the
strictures of the twenty-sixth amendment.
181 See Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 68-70 (1978).
182 See Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 681 (1973); Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S.
686, 686-87 (1973).
183

460 U.S. 780 (1983).

I Id. at 788 (emphasis added) (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730
(1974)).
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burden the right to vote are not subject to strict scrutiny, noting instead
that courts should balance the "character and magnitude of the asserted
injury" with the "precise interests" put forth by the states to justify the
restriction.' 5
Lower courts similarly have been loathe to apply strict scrutiny
when registration laws are challenged absent an absolute deprivation of
the right to vote. Indeed, in Coalitionfor Sensible & Humane Solutions v. Wamser,'8" a district court held that absent absolute preclusion
from voting, the applicable standard of review for registration restrictions was rationality.'8 7 Applying that standard, the court found that
St. Louis's refusal to deputize volunteers as voter registrars was rationally related to the city's interest in preventing fraud and maintaining
impartiality.'8 8
Several credible arguments have been put forth, however, that
demonstrate that contemporary registration laws could be subject to
successful constitutional challenges.' 89 Such a legal challenge to registration laws could serve as the underlying basis for judicial intervention
in the voter registration realm. In the case of redistricting, it was an
equal protection challenge to Tennessee's districting laws in Baker v.
Carr'90 that opened the door for the Court's mandating of the rule of
one person, one vote. A constitutional challenge to registration laws
could serve much the same purpose.
One set of promising constitutional challenges' 9 ' is premised upon
'85 See id. at 789; see also 2 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE §§

18.31(a)-18.36 (1986)

(noting that the Court has never held that all restrictions of voting would be subject to
the traditional strict scrutiny standard).
188 590 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Mo. 1984), affd, 771 F.2d 395 (8th Cir. 1985).
187 See id. at 222-23. But see Note, Voter Registration,supra note 25, at 1629-30
(arguing that the Wamser court misinterpreted McDonald v. Board of Election
Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969) by citing it for the proposition that the rationality standard is applicable absent a total deprivation of the right to vote).
188 See Wamser, 590 F. Supp. at 222; see also Edwards v. Austin, No. 84-CV8347-FL (E.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 1984) (mem.) (rejecting a challenge to Michigan registration practices, finding that there is no constitutional right to be a deputy registrar).
But see Rhode Island Minority Caucus, Inc.- v. Baronian, 590 F.2d 372, 376 (1st Cir.
1979) (though upholding denial of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction as
moot in that election had passed, stating that plaintiffs' challenges to their exclusion by
Providence's Board of Canvassers as voter registrars appear to state sufficient equal
protection injury and substantial first amendment questions if tried on the merits);
Iowa Socialist Party v. Slockett, 604 F. Supp. 1391, 1397-98 (S.D. Iowa 1985) (finding
state procedure limiting the appointment of mobile deputy registrars to those nominated
by county chairmen of the two largest political parties to be unconstitutional).
189 See sources cited supra notes 25.
'9O1369 U.S. 186 (1962).
181 It is beyond the scope of this Comment to present an analytical overview of the
potential constitutional challenges to registration laws that previously have been set
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the fundamental right to vote.19 2 It would argue that registration restrictions violate the equal protection clause by not being a sufficient
"compelling state interest" nor the "least restrictive means" of achieving such an interest. 193 In terms of the former, the limits on the hours
and locations of registration sites based upon an economic rationale
could be challenged 4s an insufficient justification when the opportunity
for citizens to register is thereby impeded."" It also could be argued
that though the prevention of vote fraud is a compelling state interest,
most states do not utilize pre-election day fraud detection methods that
would justify the resulting hindrance on registration. 9 5 Finally, it
could be demonstrated that there are alternative methods of registration
that prevent vote fraud yet are "less restrictive" in the burden that is
placed on the potential registrant.1 9 These are among the myriad of
potential constitutional arguments that could serve as the linchpin for
judicial intervention in the voter registrationorealm.
B.

Remedy of Governmental Voter Enrollment

In order to remedy satisfactorily the "critical features" that characterize the system of personal registration in the United States,1 97 as
well as satisfy the equal protection provisions that these laws violate,
the Court will be compelled to mandate uniform voter enrollment by
the government. In other words, the Court must transfer the onus of
registration from the individual to the state.
In the case of redistricting, a clear result of the rule of one person,
one vote was that it served to remedy the "critical features" that charforth. For a detailed dissemination of these arguments, see the sources cited supra note
25.
192 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964).
193 See, e.g., Comment, supra note 25, at 502-05; Note, Voter Registration, supra
note 25, at 1633-40.
1'4 See Comment, supra note 25, at 503. In Bishop v. Lorenzo, 350 F. Supp. 576
(E.D.N.Y. 1972), a federal district court agreed with this argument, finding that
"[wihen [the right to vote] is weighed in the balance against clerical inconvenience, the
latter must give way. The state may not deny a voter the right to register (and hence to
vote) because of clerical deficiencies. . . .The remedy lies in providing more clerks
rather than registering fewer voters." Id. at 587.
This argument could be extended as well to cases in which registrars refuse to
deputize others as registrars. This argument, however, has not yet been successful in
the lower courts. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
"I See Note, Voter Registration, supra note 25, at 1633-35. In practice, no state
regularly checks its registration records against those of other states, see id. at 1634 &
n.95, and many states do not require identification upon registering. See id. at 1634 &
n.98.
96 See id. at 1635-40.
197See supra notes 153-76 and accompanying text.
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acterized malapportionment in the United States."' In implicitly re-

quiring states to redistrict every ten years,199 the Court both erased the
problem of legislative self-interest in resisting reform and guaranteed
that the requirement of mathematical equality would be combined with
an automatic, decennial adjustment process.200 Any other remedy which
did not require an automatic adjustment process would have only temporarily remedied the "critical features"; malapportionment would
have grown again and legislators would have remained loathe to reform
districting laws.
In the realm of voter registration, the only judicial mandate that
would remedy the inherent "critical features" would be a requirement
that the government undertake the responsibility of uniform voter enrollment at regular intervals. "Incrementalist" remedies 0 ' "depend on
the good will and self-motivation of the state or other electoral
unit. .

.

.[w]ith no pressure [to act affirmatively,] . . .reform is un-

likely."20 2 From their disenfranchising origins 0 2 to their present status, 0 4 registration laws increasingly serve to restrict qualified citizens
from the ballot; piecemeal reforms aimed at encouraging citizens to register cannot overcome these historical burdens. Studies have demonstrated that registration drives generally are ineffective at curbing the
downward spiral of registration,20 5 and there is evidence that even in
the one state that does not require registration, North Dakota, 0 the
historical impact of registration laws impedes many citizens from the
ballot.20 ' Any remedy that retains the present situation in which the
burden of registration is placed upon the individual cannot ensure the
downward spiral of registration rates will cease.
The Court thus will be compelled to mandate that the state undertake uniform voter enrollment at regular intervals. While there are a
number of "big-bang" proposals208 for registration reform that already
1" For an analysis of these "critical features," see supra notes 140-52 and accompanying text.
199 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 583-84 (1964).
200 See supra note 147 and accompanying text; text accompanying note 152.
201 See text accompanying note 170 for a brief description of "incrementalist"

remedies.
202 Crotty, supra note 11, at 97.
202 See supra notes 26-73 and accompanying text.
20 See supra notes 78-100 and accompanying text.
205 See supra note 153.
20' See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
20 One-third of the nonvoters in North Dakota stated that they did not vote in the
1980 general election because they were not registered. See Glass, Squire & Wolfinger,
supra note 24, at 53.
28 See text accompanying note 170 for a brief description of "big-bang" remedies.
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have been put forth,20 9 it would be for the states to develop and implement programs that comport with the new constitutional mandate.
CONCLUSION

Registration laws in the United States have had an inherent and
continuing disenfranchising effect. The resulting impediment to the ballot for millions of qualified citizens threatens the very legitimacy of
democratic government.2 " As one commentator has noted, "[d]emocracy
must be its own teacher. Those whose lives are untouched by any sort
of involvement have no framework of experience within which to develop the patience and appreciation for the complexities or tradeoffs of
evolutionary progress. '
This Comment has argued that the increasingly worsening condition of the system of voter registration will, absent imminent legislative
reform, compel judicial intention similar to the affirmative action taken
by the Court when confronted with gross malapportionment. Faced
with the presence of downwardly spiralling registration rates and legislative self-interest in resisting registration reform, the Court will be
forced to require the states to undertake the responsibility of the uniform enrollment of citizens at regular intervals. This constitutional
mandate will not by itself induce a turnout in the United States comparable to those of other western nations, nor serve as a panacea for the
apathy and alienation that many citizens feel from the political process.
It will ensure, however, that the fundamental right to vote will no
longer be predicated upon obscure, complex, and historically disenfranchising registration procedures. One commentator has noted that
"[t]he more representative [government] is of the concerns of its electors, the greater its vitality and the better the long-run prognosis for its
continued health. ' 21 2 Judicial intervention in the realm of voter registration will help to guarantee that the United States will fulfill this
mandate into the twenty-first century.

209 See, e.g., Crotty, supra note 11, at 102-06 (reviewing such registration reform
proposals).
210 See sources cited supra note 177.
p. KIMBALL, supra note 18, at 290.
212 Crotty, supra note 11, at 89.

